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Abstract 
We tested the hypothesis that a pictorial attitude variant of the Implicit Association Test (PA-
IAT) is a valid measure of implicit motives.  The PA-IAT aims to capture attitudes towards 
pictures that are related to implicit motives. In the first two studies, we showed that the pictorial 
attitude IAT correlated more highly with non-IAT measures of implicit motives than other IAT 
variants.  In the third study, we established the validity of the PA-IAT experimentally and 
showed that the pictorial attitude IAT correlated with non-declarative behavioral measures only if 
implicit motives were aroused. 
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A Pictorial Attitude IAT as a Measure of Implicit Motives 
Implicit motives are motivational dispositions that are assumed to operate outside a person’s 
consciousness.  A good understanding of one’s implicit motives is of great importance because 
research over the past 50 years clearly shows that these motives influence many economic, 
societal and political phenomena independent from motivational dispositions that people attribute 
explicitly to themselves at a conscious level (see McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989, for 
a review).  Implicit and explicit motives differ in that the former are acquired during early 
childhood on the basis of non-verbal, affective experiences while the latter are cognitively more 
elaborated constructs that are acquired after the development of language and influenced by 
explicit instructions of the social and cultural environment (Kasser, Koestner, & Lekes, 2002; 
McClelland & Pilon, 1983).  Given their pre-verbal nature, it is more likely that non-verbal cues 
arouse implicit motives (Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2002; Woike, Bender, & Besner, 2009).  
Schultheiss and Brunstein (2002), for instance, demonstrated that participants’ implicit power 
motives become active only after they have the opportunity to translate the verbal instructions of 
power related goals into experiential formats by means of an imaginary exercise.   
Implicit and explicit motives differ also in their impact on behavior.  More specifically, 
implicit and explicit motives correlate with different aspects of behavior.  In general, implicit 
motives are more likely to predict general behavioral trends over time as well as non-declarative 
behavior, whereas explicit motives are more likely to predict immediate and specific declarative 
responses to specific subjective situations or choice behavior (McClelland, 1985; Schultheiss & 
Pang, 2007).  Traditional implicit motive researchers referred to these behavioral distinctions as 
operant versus respondent behavior.  Whereas operant behaviors involve automatic actions in the 
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absence of stringent situational concerns, respondent behaviors stem from conscious reactions to 
specific stimuli (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; Perugini & Leone, 2009).  
Measures of implicit power motive, for instance, have been shown to predict managerial or 
political success over time (i.e., operant or non-declarative behavior) (McClelland, et al., 1989; 
Winter, 1991).  Explicit power motive measures, on the other hand, have been shown to predict 
declarative or respondent behaviors such as prophesy task enjoyment and subjective well-being.  
Research consistently confirms this difference between implicit and explicit motives 
(McClelland, et al., 1989; Schultheiss & Pang, 2007).   
The measurement of implicit motives 
Because implicit motives differ fundamentally from explicit ones, their assessment 
requires different measurement instruments (Schultheiss, Yankova, Dirlikov, & Schad, 2009).  
Explicit motives can easily be assessed explicitly with questionnaires, unequivocally asking 
participants to what extent a certain motive is relevant for them (e.g., PRF: the Personality 
Research Form, Jackson, 1984).  Implicit motives on the other hand, are traditionally assessed 
indirectly by means of projective tests such as the Picture-Story Exercise (PSE) and the Thematic 
Apperception Test (TAT).  A typical PSE or TAT consists of four to six pictures depicting people 
in a variety of social settings.  For each picture, participants have to write an imaginative story.  
Because these tests use non-verbal cues, it is assumed that they arouse implicit motives 
(Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2002; Woike, et al., 2009).  Afterwards, one can analyze these stories 
by means of motivational content coding schemes, derived from motivational arousal studies.  
Researchers can use the obtained score as a measure of the individual’s implicit motives 
(McClelland, et al., 1989; Schultheiss & Pang, 2007).   
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Since the development and first applications of projective techniques, there has been an 
intense debate on the validity and usability of projective measures (e.g., Hibbard, 2003; Raven, 
1988).  Even though recent work confirms the good psychometric qualities of projective 
measures, (e.g., Langan-Fox & Grant, 2006; Vargas, von Hippel, & Petty, 2004), doubts about 
the validity of projective measures continued to exist.  Consequently, when new response latency 
based indirect measures were developed in the 1990s, many researchers abandoned projective 
techniques and started using response latency techniques to assess implicit processes (Vargas, et 
al., 2004).  The Implicit Association Test is probably the most well known response latency 
measure (IAT: Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).  The IAT is a computerized response 
latency task that is assumed to measure the relative strengths of associations amongst two pairs of 
contrasted concepts (e.g., ‘positive – negative’ and ‘sunshine – rain’).  Many researchers consider 
the IAT to be the most reliable and valid response latency based measure that is currently 
available (e.g., De Houwer & De Bruycker, 2007; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007).   
The IAT, initially developed to assess implicit attitudes and stereotypes (Greenwald, et 
al., 2002) has recently been applied also to assess implicit motives (Brunstein & Schmitt, 2004; 
Sheldon, King, Houser-Marko, Osbaldiston, & Gunz, 2007).  Brunstein and Schmitt (2004) were 
the first to measure achievement motivation by means of both the IAT (implicit measure) and 
explicit ratings (explicit measure).  After completion of the IAT task and explicit measures of 
achievement, participants completed a mental concentration task.  Half of them received 
achievement related feedback.  Burnstein and Schmitt (2004) found that implicit and explicit 
measures of achievement orientation were uncorrelated.  Further, when participants received 
feedback, the IAT uniquely predicted participants’ behavior (i.e., task performance) but failed to 
foresee subjective outcomes (i.e., task enjoyment).  Explicit achievement, on the contrary, 
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predicted only the subjective outcomes but not behavioral outcomes.  When participants did not 
receive feedback, both the IAT and explicit measures were unrelated to the outcome variables.  In 
fact, these results were similar to the findings of Biernat (1989) who assessed achievement 
motive with projective as well as explicit measures.  She also concluded that projective measures 
did not correlate with explicit ones, and that the projective measure predicted behavioral 
outcomes instead of subjective outcomes.  Brunstein and Shmitt’s study (2004) is of great 
significance because they were the first to show that the IAT can be used to measure implicit 
motives.  Yet, convergent validity of the IAT with projective measures was not established.     
Sheldon et al. (2007) were the first to assess implicit motives with both the IAT and a 
projective measure, the TAT.  Their results showed that both implicit measures uniquely 
predicted behavioral outcomes (e.g., motivation related choices) but not subjective outcomes 
(e.g., well-being and life satisfaction).  However, they could not establish convergent validity in 
that the correlation between the IAT and TAT was rather small (r = 0.17; p < 0.05) and both 
techniques predicted different behavioral outcome variables.  They argued that the IAT predicted 
competitive behavioral choices (i.e., social dilemma with a choice between exploitation versus 
conservation of natural resources) whereas the TAT predicted general behavioral trends (i.e., 
academic job opportunities in a distant future).  However, the conclusion that the IAT and the 
TAT captured different behavioral outcomes of implicit motives is rather premature because they 
applied only one particular instantiation of the IAT.  Moreover, there were important differences 
between their version of the IAT and the TAT.  First, both tasks differed in how implicit motives 
were measured, that is, in the type of stimuli that were used.  Whereas verbal stimuli were used in 
the IAT, the TAT made use of pictorial stimuli.  Pictorial and verbal stimuli of the same concept 
are not fully interchangeable and may assess different sets of associations (Foroni & Bel-Bahar, 
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2010).  Second, the IAT and the TAT also differed in what they measured.  The IAT measured 
the strength of the relationship between the self and need for power whereas the TAT assessed 
need for power by means of affective thoughts and feelings evoked by pictures (Bilsky & 
Schwartz, 2008).  Lastly, the IAT that Sheldon et al. used resulted in a relative measure while the 
TAT resulted in an absolute one.  These three differences could have been responsible for the fact 
that the IAT predicted different types of behavior than the TAT and the fact the IAT correlated 
only weakly with the TAT.  In sum, the question remained whether it is possible to adapt the IAT 
in such a way that it serves as an alternative to projective measures for the assessment of implicit 
motives.  This is an important question because the IAT could offer a better way of assessing 
implicit motives.  First, unlike measures such as the TAT, it does not require extensive scoring 
and interpretation of responses.  Second, the split-half and test-retest reliability of IAT effects are 
relatively high in comparison with other implicit measurement procedures (Schnabel, Asendorpf, 
& Greenwald, 2008).  Third, it is likely that the IAT is less controllable than projective measures 
because it relies on response latencies whereas projective measures rely on the content of what 
participants say.  Consequently, projective measures are more prone to intentional manipulations 
(Teige-Mocigemba & Klauer, 2008). 
We therefore set out to develop an IAT measure of implicit motives that differed in two 
important ways from the variant used by Sheldon et al.  (2007).  Because implicit motives are 
based on early, nonverbal experiences, not accessible via introspection, we assumed that IATs 
that make use of pictorial stimuli will be able to capture the same aspects of implicit motives as 
projective measures.  Moreover, compared to verbal stimuli, pictorial stimuli enclose more 
concept-relevant information which make them more appropriate to capture stable traits such as 
motives (Gschwendner, Hofmann, & Schmitt, 2008).  Furthermore, we altered the target 
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categories.  Instead of target categories representing the self-concept, we applied affective target 
categories because projective measures primarily assess the affective aspects of motivational 
domains (Bilsky & Schwartz, 2008; McClelland, 1985; McClelland, et al., 1989).  In sum, we 
hypothesized that pictorial IATs with affective target categories would show greater convergence 
with projective tests.   
In the first two studies, we assessed one implicit motive, need for power, with different 
versions of the IAT.  More precisely, we manipulated how the IAT was constructed (pictorial 
versus verbal stimuli) and what it measured (associations with the concept “self” versus affective 
evaluation of pictures).  As such, the aim of the first two studies was to test whether a pictorial 
IAT with affective target categories was, as hypothesized, the best candidate IAT measure of 
implicit motives.  Validity of the IAT variants was tested using a correlational approach: 
correlations with (semi-) projective and explicit measures of implicit motives were included to 
test convergent validity.  Moreover, correlations with operant and respondent conceptualizations 
of environmentalism served as behavioral criterion correlates of implicit power motivation.  The 
primary objective of the third and final study was to further examine the validity of the pictorial 
IAT with affective target categories.  Therefore, validity was tested also experimentally, an 
approach that is strongly recommended for the development of new measures (Borsboom, 
Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2004; De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009).  
More specifically, we examined whether the IAT measure was sensitive to the degree to which 
implicit motives were aroused.  
Study 1 
Design and Participants 
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In Study 1, we conducted a between-subjects comparison of a verbal self (VS-) IAT and 
pictorial attitude (PA-) IAT to assess implicit motives.  In the VS-IAT, verbal motive exemplars 
(e.g., prestigious) and verbal-concept exemplars (e.g., me) were presented.  The PA-IAT, on the 
other hand, was designed to achieve a maximal conceptual correspondence with classic measures 
of implicit motives such as the TAT.  This means that pictorial stimuli were used in combination 
with affective target categories.  In addition to the IAT, participants completed a projective test 
and an explicit measure of implicit motives (within-subjects).  Afterwards, respondents answered 
a number of questions about environmentalism.   
In total, we recruited 160 undergraduate university students for participation in our 
experiment.  Students participated for partial fulfillment of additional course requirements.  
Participants were tested in groups of up to five participants at a time.  They were seated in 
cubicles isolating them from outside views and noises.  After controlling for fast responses in the 
IAT (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) and missing data, 145 participants were included in our 
final sample.  By taking part in the study, participants had the chance to win a restaurant voucher 
of 5 Euro.  Mean age was 20.8 (SD = 3.5) and 25 participants were men (17.2%).  Sixty-five 
participants completed the VS-IAT and eighty completed the PA-IAT. 
Measures and Materials 
Need for Power: Implicit Association Test.  We created two IATs: a VS-IAT and a PA-
IAT.  Brunstein and Schmitt’s IAT (2004) study formed the basis for the VS-IAT.  We used 
(Dutch translations of) the labels “me” (ik) versus “other” (ander) for the target categories, and 
the labels “power” (macht) versus “non-power” (geen macht) as labels for the attribute 
categories.  Shultheisses’ definition and description of need for power (i.e., the capacity to derive 
pleasure from having impact on others, but not from being aggressive or irresponsible; 
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Schultheiss, in press) formed the inspiration for the stimuli representing the attribute categories.  
The stimuli were “prestigious” (prestigieus), “influential” (invloedrijk), “impressive” 
(indrukwekkend), “important” (belangrijk), “all-knowing” (alwetend), and “authoritative” 
(gezaghebbend) for the category “power”, and “ordinary” (alledaags), “docile” (volgzaam), 
“submissive” (onderdanig), “humble” (nederig), “resigned” (gelaten), and “modest” (bescheiden) 
for the category “non-power”.  Furthermore, stimuli representing the target category “me” (ik) 
were “I” (ik), “mine” (mijn), ”own” (eigen), and “self” (zelf) while the exemplars of the target 
category “other” (ander) were “them” (hen), “they” (zij), “their” (hun), and “others” (anderen).   
In order to increase the conceptual correspondence with projective measures such as the 
TAT (Hofmann, et al., 2005), we created a PA-IAT that differed from the VS-IAT in two 
important ways.  First, we used affective target categories (‘attractive’ versus ‘not attractive’).  
Stimuli representing the target categories were “nice” (leuk), “friendly” (aardig), “pleasant” 
(plezant), “great” (fijn), “lovely” (prettig), and “decent” (tof) for “attractive” (aantrekkelijk), and 
“creepy” (akelig), “unpleasant” (onprettig), “nasty” (lastig), “unfavourable” (ongunstig), 
“annoying” (ambetant) and “undesired” (ongewenst) for “not attractive” (onaantrekkelijk).  
Secondly, we utilized pictures as stimuli of the attribute categories.  These pictures were all 
pretested.  Forty-five undergraduate university students participated in this pre-test.  Each 
participant evaluated a series of 45 pictures that three experts selected on their potential to 
represent a situation where need for power was either an important motive or not at all.  For each 
picture, respondents indicated the fit with the following description of need for power 
(Schultheiss, in press): “This picture fits with someone who: ‘likes to influence other people’, 
‘wants to elicit prestige’, ‘likes to show to other people that he/she holds an important position’, 
and ‘is able to manipulate people’”.  Participants rated the pictures on a 7-point likert scale with 
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the following anchor points: 1 = “Fits very well with the description”, through 7 = “Fits not at all 
with the description”.  The pictorial IATs in this study used the seven pictures with the highest 
mean scores (Range of Means: 5.7 – 6.5) and the seven pictures with the lowest mean scores 
(Range of Means: 2.1 – 2.8) as exemplars of the attribute categories “power” and “non-power”.   
The VS-IAT consisted of seven blocks of trials in which participants were instructed to 
categorize words as quickly as possible into different categories by pressing a left (D) or right (K) 
key on an AZERTY keyboard.  Each item was presented equally often and in a random order.  In 
Block 1 (24 trials) participants had to sort self and other related items into the ‘Me’ and ‘Other’ 
categories.  Half of the respondents started with the ‘Me’ category on the left side and the ‘Other’ 
category on the right side.  The other part of the participants started with the categories in 
reversed position.  Block 2 (24 trials), required participants to distinguish items representing 
power or non-power.  The ‘Power’ category was assigned to the left key and the ‘Non Power’ 
category to the right key for all participants.  Block 3 (24 trials) and Block 4 (40 trials) combined 
the ‘Me – Other’ categories and the ‘Power - Non Power’ categories.  The position of the 
categories and their assignment to response keys were identical to those in Blocks 1 and 2.  Block 
5 (24 trials) was identical to Block 2, except that the positions of the ‘Power’ and ‘Non Power’ 
categories and their corresponding response keys were reversed.  Finally, Block 6 (24 trials) and 
Block 7 (40 trials) were identical to Blocks 3 and 4 except for the reversed position of the 
‘Power’ and ‘Non-power’ categories and their assignment to the response keys.  In the four 
combined tasks (Blocks 3, 4, 6 and 7), target and attribute related exemplars alternated from trial 
to trial. 
Stimuli were presented in the center of the screen.  Target and attribute labels were 
displayed on the upper right and left corner of the white screen.  Interstimulus interval was 
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200ms.  False responses were followed by an error message that disappeared only after 
participants pressed the correct response.   
The procedure of the PA-IAT was identical to the procedure of the VS-IAT.  For the PA-
IAT, the ‘Me – Other’ categories and their corresponding exemplars were replaced by the 
‘Attractive – Not Attractive’ categories and their representing exemplars.  Furthermore, we used 
pictures instead of words as exemplars of the ‘Power-Non power’ categories.   
IAT effects were calculated using the recommended D600 scoring algorithm of 
Greenwald et al.  (2003) based on the data collected in Blocks 3, 4, 6 and 7. 
We estimated internal consistency of the IATs by dividing each combined block into two 
sub-blocks of equal length.  The first block comprised the even trials and the second the odd 
trials.  Next, we calculated the IAT effects for each sub-block.  The Spearman–Brown 
coefficients revealed a good split-half reliability for both IATs (VS-IAT: r = .67; PA-IAT: r 
=.87).  The IAT was programmed and administered with the INQUISIT Milliseconds software 
package (2008). 
Need for Power: explicit measure.  Explicit Need for Power was assessed with a 
constant sum scale.  Participants were asked to distribute exactly 100 points among the three 
foundational human motivations: need for Power, need for Affiliation and need for Achievement.  
Each motivation was briefly described by the experimenter.  The definitions and descriptions of 
Schultheiss (in press) formed the foundation for these descriptions.  Respondents indicated to 
what extent each motivation fitted them by means of allocating a portion of 100 points to these 
motivations.  More points indicated a better fit.  In this way, we obtained a relative measure that 
should improve the conceptual correspondence with both the IAT as well as the projective 
measure (Hofmann et al., 2005). 
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Need for Power: projective test.  In the first study, we used a projective measure that 
could serve as an initial, easily applicable criterion to test the validity of the two versions of the 
IAT.  Therefore, we used a quantitative alternative to the TAT as projective measure.  We 
preferred a quantitative projective measure to cancel out subjectivity of the coding of the story as 
source of method variance.  The projective measure that we used was based on Schmalt’s Power 
Motive Grid (Schmalt, 1987).  Instead of writing a story of the situation depicted on the picture, 
participants indicated on a seven-point likert scale to which extent the picture made them feel 
good or bad.  To complete the test, each participant evaluated seven pictures that aroused the 
implicit motive of need for power and seven pictures that aroused other implicit motives (need 
for affiliation and need for achievement).  The pictures were the same as those used in the PA-
IAT.  The projective measure was calculated as the difference between the mean score of the 
power motive pictures and the mean score of the other motive pictures.  As such, like the IATs, 
the obtained measure has to be interpreted as a relative measure.   
Dependent variables: environmentalism.  In order to assess predictive validity, we 
introduced environmentalism as a dependent variable.  Research suggested that people scoring 
high on need for power are significantly less concerned with the environment (e.g., Schultz, et al., 
2005; Sheldon, et al., 2007).  Because previous research indicated that the implicit (IAT and 
projective measures) and explicit measures predicted different aspects of behavior (cf.  supra), we 
also measured environmentalism on two different dimensions.  First, we estimated one’s general 
level of environmentalism because previous research suggested that measures of implicit motives 
predominantly correlated with general behavioral trends.  Furthermore, because general 
environmentalism was formulated in general terms and did not comprise any personal nor any 
specific situational cue, it could be interpreted as an indicator of operant behaviors.  Second, we 
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assessed subjective environmentalism.  Because this concept was formulated in a personal way 
and involves reactions to specific stimuli, subjective environmentalism could be interpreted as an 
indicator of respondent behavior.  Following, for instance, Sheldon et al.  (2007), we assumed 
that measures of implicit motives would correlate with general environmentalism (operant 
behaviors) whereas measures of explicit motives would correlate with subjective 
environmentalism (respondent behaviors).  We will now describe both measures of 
environmentalism.   
General behavioral trends, or general environmentalism, was assessed by means of 
statements about how individuals thought the educational system or society should deal with 
environmental issues.  Behavioral changes resulting from the actions or issues formulated in 
these statements had an impact only in the long run and on the society as a whole.  An exemplar 
item is “courses in economics should pay more attention to the consequences of economic growth 
on the environment”.  Subjective environmentalism was examined with items adopted from 
Schuhwerk and Lefkoff-Hagius’ (1995) scale.  This scale measured someone’s personal concern 
for the environment as well as his or her individual willingness to work toward its protection.  A 
sample item of the scale was “I am concerned about the environment”.  Both the general and 
subjective environmentalism scale consisted of four five-point Likert-type items with the anchors 
1 = “strongly disagree”, through 5 = ”strongly agree”.  We calculated the individual measures as 
the mean score of the scale items.  Internal consistency of these scales was satisfactory (general 
environmentalism: M = 3.90; SD =.57; α = .68; subjective environmentalism: M = 3.51; SD = 
.62; α = .81).  For both, the general and subjective measure, high scores indicated positive 
behavioral intentions toward the environment. 
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Procedure 
We presented all measures in a fixed order because our analysis focused on the 
correlations between the different measurement procedures.  Randomizing or counterbalancing 
might introduce error variance per respondent and thus deflate correlations (Gawronski, 2002).  
We first presented the projective technique, followed by the IAT, then the explicit need for power 
and, finally, the behavioral questions on environmentalism.   
Results 
Relations between the different measures of need for power measures.  Correlations 
between the IAT, the explicit measure of need for power, and the projective measure of need for 
power were calculated for the two conditions separately .  The non-significant correlations 
between the three measures of need for power in the VS-IAT condition, reported in Table 1a, 
suggested that the three measures of need for power (VS-IAT, projective, and self-attributions) 
did not capture the same constructs.   
<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
A different result emerged in the condition in which participants completed the PA-IAT.  
The PA-IAT did correlate with both the projective measure and the explicit measure whereas the 
projective measure only correlated with the PA-IAT (see Table 1b).  When we compared the two 
conditions with each other, we noticed that only the correlation between the IAT and projective 
measure was marginally significant different (rVS-IAT-projective = .00, rPA-IAT-projective = .29, z=1.78, 
p<.10).  Summarizing the results in terms of our expectations, we found a first indication that the 
PA-IAT is a valid measure of implicit motives and that it outperforms the VS-IAT in assessing 
implicit motives.  Conceptual correspondence between the IAT and the projective measure does 
seem to increase correlations between both.   
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Relations between measures of need for power and measures of environmentalism.  
Tables 2a and 2b show the zero-order correlations between the need for power measures and the 
indices of environmentalism, split by the type of IAT (VS-IAT or PA-IAT).  As represented in 
Table 2a, the VS-IAT did not correlate with any of the environmentalism variables.  Conversely, 
correlations of the PA-IAT with the indices of general and subjective environmentalism were 
marginally significant (see Table 2b).  Furthermore, a Fisher’s Z transformation revealed that the 
difference between the VS-IAT and PA-IAT was marginally significant for general 
environmentalism (z = 1.84 , p < .10).  Next, the projective measure clearly correlated with 
general environmentalism in both conditions.  Finally, correlations with the explicit measure 
were not consistent.  As reported in Table 2b, the explicit measure was significantly correlated 
with both indices of environmentalism in the PA-IAT condition whereas in the VS-IAT 
condition, the explicit measure was marginally correlated only with subjective environmentalism 
(see Table 2a). 
<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
Even though the results were in line with our expectations, the correlational results might 
have been biased by the fact that the PA-IAT was somewhat more reliable (r = .87) than the VS-
IAT (r = .67).  To further examine this issue, we corrected the correlations between the IATs and 
the environmentalism variables for attenuation due to unreliability.  Results, however, showed 
that correlations involving the VS-IAT condition versus the PA-IAT condition still varied 
substantially.  The corrected correlations with subjective environmentalism were -.24 for the VS-
IAT condition and -.23 for the PA-IAT condition.  For general environmentalism, the corrected 
correlations were .10 (VS-IAT condition) and -.21 (PA-IAT condition).  Differences between 
Fisher’s r-to-z transformations did not reveal any discrepancy with the uncorrected correlations.  
Running Head: PICTORIAL ATTITUDE IAT AND IMPLICIT MOTIVES  17 
 
(i.e., PA-IAT correlated higher with general environmentalism).  These additional analyses 
indicated that differences in reliability did not fully account for the predictive advantage of the 
PA-IAT.   
Discussion 
Study 1 provided initial evidence for the hypothesis that the PA-IAT is a valid measure of 
implicit motives and is a better measure of implicit motives than the VS-IAT.  Compared to the 
VS-IAT, the correlation between the PA-IAT and the projective measure was not only higher, but 
its predictive utility for behavior was also greater.  The association patterns further revealed that 
the PA-IAT leaned closer towards the projective measure than the VS-IAT did.  Even though 
differences in correlations were only marginally significant, the results did confirm the validity of 
the PA-IAT whereas no evidence was found for the validity of the VS-IAT.  However, the design 
of the first study did not enable us to reveal why only the PA-IAT turned out to be valid. The VS-
IAT differed from the PA-IAT not only in the type of stimuli that were used (words or pictures) 
but also in the type of associations that were measures (associations with the concept “self” or 
associations with the concept “attractive”).  To determine which difference was crucial, we 
replicated the first study, but instead of a VS-IAT, we used a pictorial IAT for measuring 
associations with the self. 
Study 2 
Design and Participants 
The design of the second study mirrored that of the first one.  This means that we 
compared two versions of the IAT using a between-subjects design.  Each participant also 
completed the projective test and explicit measures of implicit motives.  Finally, participants 
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completed the same questions on environmentalism as in Study 1.  The only difference was that 
we now compared a PA-IAT with a pictorial self (PS-)IAT. 
One-hundred-fourteen male (n = 36) and female (n = 78) undergraduate university 
students participated for partial fulfillment of additional course requirements.  Mean age was 20.7 
(SD = 1.9).  Half of the participants completed the PS-IAT while the other half were given the 
PA-IAT. 
Measures, Materials, and Procedure 
The PA-IAT was exactly the same as in Study 1.  The PS-IAT employed the same 
pictures as the PA-IAT and used identical attribute exemplars and attribute category labels as the 
VS-IAT of our first study.  The IAT procedure mirrored the procedure applied in Study 1. 
We estimated internal consistency of the IATs in the same way as in Study 1.  The 
Spearman–Brown coefficients revealed a good split-half reliability for both IATs (PS-IAT: r = 
.65; PA-IAT: r =.85 ).  Internal consistency of all other measures was also satisfactory (projective 
test: α = .66; subjective environmentalism: α = .86; general environmentalism: α = .74). 
We first presented the projective technique, followed by the IAT, then the explicit need 
for power and finally the behavioral questions on environmentalism. 
Results 
Relations between the different measures of need for power.  In line with the first 
study, we first analyzed correlations between the IAT, explicit, and projective measure of need 
for power in each of the two conditions.  The PS-IAT correlated neither with the explicit nor with 
the projective measure of need for power, indicating that these measures did not capture similar 
constructs (see Table 1c).   
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Comparable with the first study, the PA-IAT did correlate significantly with the projective 
measure, thus supporting the validity of the PA-IAT.  The correlation matrix reported in Table 1d 
did reveal some differences between the two measures in that the correlation of the PA-IAT with 
the explicit measure was not significant whereas the correlation between the projective and 
explicit need for power measure was significant.  However, these small differences could have 
been due to sampling error. Comparing the correlations of the PS-IAT and the PA-IAT with the 
explicit and projective measures, we observed  a significant difference in correlation with the 
projective measure (z = 2.56; p < .05) but not with the explicit measure.  Clearly, the PA-IAT but 
not the PS-IAT shared a substantial amount of variance with the projective measure. 
Associations of the need for power measures with environmentalism.  On the whole, 
Study 2 confirmed the findings of Study 1.  The zero-order correlations, reported in Tables 3c 
and 3d, show that the projective measure was predictive for general environmentalism in both 
conditions.  Taking into account both experimental conditions in the two studies, general 
environmentalism was the only behavioral variable that consistently correlated with the 
projective measure.  Furthermore, Fisher’s Z transformations did not reveal any difference 
between studies or between conditions for the projective measure, p > .05.   
The results of the PA-IAT were also largely consistent across conditions and across 
studies.  In Study 2, its correlation with general environmentalism was even significant whereas 
in Study 1, it was only marginally significant.  The PS-IAT did not correlate with any of the 
environmentalism variables, neither general not subjective environmentalism.  Nonetheless, 
comparing the correlations of the PA-IAT and the PS-IAT using Z values of Fisher’s r-to-z 
transformations, we did not find evidence for differences between the two IATs in their relation 
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to measures of environmentalism, p > .10.  Finally and contrary to Study 1, the explicit measure 
was not correlated with the indices of subjective or general environmentalism.   
Discussion 
The main finding of the two studies can be summarized easily: We consistently obtained 
evidence for the validity of the PA-IAT but not for the validity of the other (VS- and PS-) IATs 
as a measure of the implicit power motive. This conclusion is based on the fact that (a) only the 
PA-IAT was related to the projective measure of the implicit power motive and (b) only the PA-
IAT predicted general or operant behavioral trends that are assumed to be determined by implicit 
motives (i.e., general environmentalism).  Confirming the divergent validity of the PA-IAT, it 
was not related to responses in specific or personal situations (i.e., subjective environmentalism).  
Similar evidence did not emerge for the VS- and PS- variants of the IAT.  Nevertheless, some 
limitations should be acknowledged.  First, the status of motive-grids as projective measures of 
implicit motives is questionable (Schultheiss et al., 2009).  On the one hand, motive-grid authors 
such as Schmalt (1987) claim that motive-grids are valid measurement instrument of implicit 
motives, but on the other hand firm validity tests are still lacking.  Kehr (2004) and Brunstein and 
Heckhausen (2008) for instance, failed to report significant correlations between motive-grids 
and projective measures such as the TAT .  Second, in the first two studies we used a 
correlational approach to validate the PS-IAT as measurement instrument of implicit motives 
where as traditional motive measures were validated experimentally (e.g., Smith, 1992 for an 
overview).   
Third, in the first two studies, we used self-report measures of attitudes towards the 
environment as a criterion-validity correlate of implicit power motivation.  Even though we made 
a clear distinction between operant and respondent behavior, any self-report question, regardless 
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whether they are indicators of operant or respondent behaviors, might not be optimal for the 
validation of implicit motive measures.  Schultheiss (2008) for instance, mentioned that self-
report measures frequently fail to correlate with traditional implicit motive measures such as the 
TAT and PSE.  We therefore conducted a third study to address these limitations and thereby 
provide additional evidence of the validity of the PS-IAT as measure of implicit power motive 
Study 3 
In this final study, we addressed these issues in the following ways.  First, rather than 
assessing the validity of the PA-IAT by correlating it with a motive-grid measure, we used an 
experimental design to test the validity of the PA-IAT.  More specifically, we varied the degree 
to which the need for power motive was aroused and examined whether the PA-IAT score was 
influenced by this manipulation.  Second, rather than correlating the PA-IAT with self-reports of 
environmentalism, we correlated it with an actual (non-declarative) behavior.  We will now 
discuss both of these changes in more detail.   
We opted for an experimental approach because, as pointed out by Borsboom et al.  
(2004, p.  1061) and recently emphasized by De Houwer et al.  (2009), ‘a test is valid for 
measuring an attribute if and only if … variations in the attribute causally produce variations in 
the outcomes of the measurement procedure’.  Because validity implies causality, we thus need 
evidence that variations in implicit need for power indeed cause variation in the PA-IAT measure 
of implicit power motive.  For this, we created two experimental conditions, one in which need 
for power was aroused and one in which it was not aroused.  This experimental approach fits very 
well with the traditional motive – incentive – behavior model of motivation (McClelland, et al., 
1989) and the gatekeeper model (Perugini & Prestwich, 2007).  In brief, the motive – incentive – 
behavior model postulates that motives become aroused and affect operant or non-declarative 
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behavior only in the presence of tasks or incentives that are inherently rewarding for individuals 
high in a given motive.  The gatekeeper model implies that implicit measures of a certain concept 
(e.g., need for power) will be related more strongly to behavior when that concept is aroused by 
an experimental manipulation. Translating these models to our experimental approach, arousing 
the need for power motive should result in (a) overall larger PA-IAT effects and (b) an increase 
in the extent to which the PA-IAT measure is more sensitive to variances in motive relevant 
behavior. The first hypothesis was tested by comparing the size of the PA-IAT effect in the two 
conditions. The second hypothesis was examined by comparing the relation between the PA-IAT 
and the (non-declarative) criterion behavior in the two conditions. If the overall PA-IAT effect is 
larger and the PA-IAT correlates more strongly with the criterion behavior when implicit need 
for power is aroused, this would provide further evidence for the validity of the PA-IAT as a 
measure of implicit need for power. Note that the experimental approach is in fact also the 
approach that motive researchers have used consistently for the development of the traditional 
content coding measures for the past fifty years (see Smith, 1992, for an overview). 
Our choice of the non-declarative criterion behavior was based on a study by Woike, 
Bender, and Besner (2009).  In that study, participants were asked to recall three different types 
of words: (a) previously presented words from a predefined list of neutral and motive-related 
words, (b) words that were generated by the participants in response to each of the presented 
words, and (c) the exact pairs of the displayed and self-generated words.  In line with Woike et al.  
(2009), we assumed that, in the condition in which the need for power was aroused, the number 
of recalled power-related words would be positively related to the strength of the power 
motivation.  Because need for power was not aroused in the control condition, no such 
relationship was expected in this condition.  To test the divergent validity of the PA-IAT, we also 
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obtained a measure of declarative behavior by asking participants to report the extent to which 
they enjoyed the task.  Given that need for power is assumed to influence primarily non-
declarative behavior, we did not expect a relationship between the PA-IAT and task enjoyment. 
Design and participants 
The design of the third study consisted of three parts: (a) the experimental manipulation in 
which need for power was aroused for half of the participants, (b) the measurement of motives 
and (c) the measurement of non-declarative and declarative behaviors. 
The whole procedure was programmed and administered online using INQUISIT Milliseconds 
software (2008).  Only participants who spent more than five minutes on the experimental 
manipulation were included in the study. Given that tasks designed to arouse implicit motives 
tend to last about ten minutes (e.g., Schultheiss and Brunstein, 1999; Woike et al., 2009), a task 
engagement of five minutes can be considered as close to the minimal time necessary for the 
arousal of implicit motives. Note that selecting a cut-off point of 5 minutes rather than the more 
standard 10 minutes could, if anything, reduce the chance of finding an effect of our 
manipulation. We nevertheless used this conservative cut-off point in order retain a sufficient 
number of participants in our study. From the three hundred thirty one students who visited our 
website from which the study could be launched, two hundred eight students started our study 
and one hundred students spent at least five minutes to the experimental manipulation. All of the 
remaining participants were between the age of 18 and 25.  Fifty three were assigned to the 
control condition and forty seven to the power condition.   
Measures, materials and procedure 
For the experimental manipulation, we used autobiographical narratives.  Narrative 
studies have consistently shown relations between specific implicit motives and the content of the 
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autobiographical narratives (e.g., McAdams, 1982; Woike, et al., 2009) and were regularly used 
to arouse specific motivations (e.g., Woike, 2008; Woike, et al., 2009).  Participants were 
randomly assigned to either a control condition or a power-arousing condition.  In the control 
condition, participants were asked to write down a common, everyday experience, that is, the 
routine events of a typical day.  In the power-arousal condition, participants had to describe as 
vividly and as detailed as possible a memory of a significant event where they dominated the 
situation and had control over others.   
Afterwards, need for power was measured by the PA-IAT (implicit measure) and by a 
constant sum scale (explicit measure).  The procedures and materials used for the PA-IAT and 
the explicit measure were identical to those of the previous two studies.  Internal consistency of 
the IATs was estimated in the same way as in Studies 1 and 2.  The Spearman–Brown 
coefficients revealed a good split-half reliability for the PA-IATs in both condition (power 
arousal condition: r = .88; control condition: r =.85).   
The procedure that served as an input for the non-declarative measure, was a memory 
recall task that was borrowed from Woike et al. (2009, Study 1).  For this task, participants first 
received a randomized list of 14 pretested neutral words and 14 power-related words.  For each 
given word, they were instructed to write down the first word they spontaneously associated with 
the displayed word.  When this was finished, participants were first asked to recall the displayed 
words, then the self-generated words, and finally the pairs of displayed and self-generated words.  
Participants could enter their answers one at a time on a computer.  Finally, task enjoyment was 
assessed.  Participants had to rate the different parts of the memory recall task on how enjoyable 
they found each part, that is, (1) generating words, (2) recalling the displayed words, (3) the self-
generated words, and (4) the pairs of displayed and self-generated words.  Answers were 
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administered on seven-point Likert-scales with the anchors 1 = “Not enjoyable at all”, through 7 
= ”Very Enjoyable”.  We calculated the individual measures as the mean score of the four scales.  
Internal consistency of these scales was satisfactory (M = 4.72; SD = 1.12; α = .88). 
Results 
For the analysis, the recalled words were summed to make three kinds of dependent 
variables: number of correctly recalled (a) displayed words, (b) self-generated word, and (c) pairs 
of displayed and self-generated words.  Scores were calculated separately for power and neutral 
displayed words.  Two research assistants who were blind to the manipulation independently 
categorized the self-generated words as power or neutral words.  They agreed in 93% of all cases.  
Disagreement was solved by means of discussion.   
Next, as a manipulation check, the stories of the participants were content analyzed for 
neutral versus power themes by two trained coders who were also blind to the manipulation.  
Nine participants in the power condition were removed from analysis because their stories 
provided memories deviant from the power motive.  After exclusion of these participants, the 
sample consisted of 91 respondents: 38 in the power-arousal condition and 58 in control 
condition.   
Effects of the experimental manipulation on the PA-IAT.  We conducted a t-test with 
the PA-IAT measure as dependent variable and experimental condition (power-arousing versus 
control condition) as grouping variable.  The results showed that the IAT effect was larger in 
power-arousal condition than in the control condition, t(89) = 2.10, p < .05.  Arousing the 
implicit power motive clearly made the allocation of pictorial and attitudinal stimuli easier when 
the positive target category was assigned to the same key as the power attribute category.  To 
ascertain that we only aroused implicit power motives, we further conducted t-tests with explicit 
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need for power and task enjoyment as dependent variables.  As expected, neither explicit need for 
power, nor task enjoyment differed significantly between the power-arousing and control 
condition (explicit need for power: t(89) = 1.38, p > .05; task enjoyment: t(89) = .93, p > .05).   
<INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
Correlations with declarative and non-declarative measures.  Next, correlations were 
computed between implicit and explicit need for power scores and the declarative (i.e., task 
enjoyment) and non-declarative variables (i.e., number of recalled displayed, self-generated and 
word pairs; see Table 3).  In the power-arousal condition, the PA-IAT scores correlated 
significantly with the number of recalled power-related displayed words, the self-generated 
words and pairs of self-generated and displayed words.  None of these correlations were 
significant in the control condition.  Fisher’s Z transformations revealed that the correlations 
were significantly higher in the power-arousal condition than in the control condition for the self 
generated words and marginally significantly higher for the pairs of self-generated and displayed 
power words.  In sum, we largely confirmed Woike et al.’s (2009) findings that arousing implicit 
motives facilitates the elaboration of recently acquired information related to the motive, and that 
this information is retained in memory better than other types of information.  In contrast to 
Woike et al., however, we used the PA-IAT scores as a measure of need for power, thus 
confirming the validity of this measure.  Our results are also in line with the gatekeeper model 
(Perugini & Prestwich, 2007).  Implicit need for power was only correlated with the number of 
recalled power related words when the power motive was experimentally aroused. Also in line 
with our expectations, correlations between the declarative variable, task enjoyment, and implicit 
power motive were in neither condition significant.  However, contrary to our expectations, the 
correlation between explicit need for power and task enjoyment was not significant either. A 
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possible explanation for this might be that participants were not able to compare their task 
performance (i.e. the number of recalled word) with the performance of others.  This condition 
might have been necessary to find a significant correlation between explicit need for power and 
task enjoyment (e.g. Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999).   
Finally, the fact that it was impossible for participants to compare their task performance 
with that of others, might also explain why participants with a high explicit need for power 
showed a tendency to underperform on the recall tasks (Table 3: see the negative, but not 
significant correlations between explicit need for power and task performance).  The lack of 
social comparisons might have made people with a high explicit need for power less motivated to 
perform well.  
General Discussion 
Our results support the hypothesis that the PA-IAT is a valid measure of implicit motives, 
more specifically, need for power.  In the first two studies, we showed that the PA-IAT is 
superior to the VS- and PS- variants of the IAT as a measure of implicit need for power.  The 
data from these studies also provided the first indications that the PA-IAT predicts the kind of 
general behavioral trends or operant behaviors that are assumed to be determined by implicit 
motives (i.e., general environmentalism).  Confirming the divergent validity of the PA-IAT, it 
was not related to responses in specific situations or respondent behaviors (i.e., situational 
environmentalism).  Similar evidence did not emerge for the VS- and PS- variants of the IAT.  In 
the third study, the validity of the PA-IAT was further established, by both an experimental and 
correlational approach.  Variations in implicit need for power caused differences in the 
magnitude of the PA-IAT score.  In addition, PA-IAT scores correlated in the predicted manner 
Running Head: PICTORIAL ATTITUDE IAT AND IMPLICIT MOTIVES  28 
 
with memory for power-related words.  Therefore, we can conclude that the PA-IAT is a valid 
measure of implicit need for power.   
There are several possible reasons why the PA-IAT is particularly successful as a measure 
of implicit motives.  First, it employs pictorial rather than verbal stimuli.  It is generally assumed 
that implicit motives are based on nonverbal experiences (e.g., McClelland et al., 1989).  Because 
of this, nonverbal (e.g., pictorial) stimuli that relate to implicit motives might be particularly 
suitable for capturing those motives.  Although our results do not refute this hypothesis, the 
results of Study 2 do show that the use of suitable pictorial stimuli is not sufficient to ensure the 
measurement of implicit motives.  Even though pictorial stimuli were presented in both the PS-
IAT and the PA-IAT, only the PA-IAT was related to the (semi-) projective test and general 
environmentalism.  These findings confirm the idea that, in order to capture implicit motives, it is 
important to assess the affective responses to motivationally relevant stimuli.  Standard projective 
tests are directed at registering such affective responses (Bilsky & Schwartz, 2008; McClelland, 
1985; McClelland, et al., 1989).  Our results suggest that variants of the IAT that are designed to 
capture affective reactions to motivationally relevant (pictorial) stimuli, can provide a valid 
measure of these motives.  Note that our findings are also in line with the general idea that 
conceptual correspondence is an important determinant of the relation between different 
measures: Whether different measures correlate and predict the same variables depends on 
whether they are designed to capture the same attribute (for the relation between projective and 
explicit measures, see: Bilsky & Schwartz, 2008; for the relation between the IAT and explicit 
measures, see Hofmann et al., 2005).   
Our findings go beyond the results of previous studies in which the IAT was used as a 
measure of implicit motives.  Whereas Sheldon et al.  (2007) concluded that implicit motive IATs 
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are useful to predict dilemma outcomes, our findings clearly show that at least some variants of 
the IATs also successfully predict general behavioral trends (Study 1 and 2) and non-declarative 
measures (Study 3) .  This is important because implicit motives are assumed to be related 
primarily to the latter classes of behaviors.  Sheldon et al.  (2007) probably failed to successfully 
predict general behavioral trends because the properties of their variant of the IAT were not 
optimal to assess implicit motives.  If they had applied a PA version of the IAT, they might have 
been able to predict general behavioral variables as well.  Our results also extend Brunstein and 
Schmitt’s (2004).  In their study, they measured implicit need for achievement with a traditional 
IAT (i.e., a verbal self variant).  Their results might have been even more convincing if they had 
applied a pictorial variant of the IAT.   
Our studies also have some limitations.  First, we assessed only the implicit motive for 
power.  It still needs to be examined whether the PA-IAT could be a useful measurement 
instrument for studying other motives or other constructs, such as personality traits, that are also 
acquired during early childhood on the basis of nonverbal, affective experiences (e.g., Mahler, 
1963).  Second, in Study 1 and 2, we used only a quantitative projective technique as the criteria 
to test the validity of our IAT effects.  Future research should test whether the PA-IAT is related 
also to purely qualitative projective measures.  Especially its correspondence with the TAT or 
PSE would be interesting.  Third, the specific benefits of pictorial stimuli in IAT measures of 
implicit motives need to be examined further.  More specifically, we did not yet examine the 
possibility that an IAT directed at assessing affective reactions to motivationally relevant words 
might also be a valid measure of implicit motives.  Fourth, because the findings of the third study 
are based on relatively small sample sizes, further replication studies with bigger samples are 
warranted.  
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To conclude, the studies reported in this paper elucidate the conditions under which IAT 
effects can provide a valid measure of implicit motives.  They also demonstrate that IAT 
measures can be optimized by increasing the conceptual correspondence with more traditional 
measures such as exiting projective tests.  This illustrates that current research on implicit 
measures can benefit from recycling fruitful insights gained during early times.   
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Table 1: correlations among the need for power measures (off-diagonal) and internal 
consistencies (on diagonal) 
STUDY I 
 a) Verbal Self IAT (n=65) b) Pictorial Attitude IAT (n=80) 
 IAT Projective Explicit IAT Projective Explicit 
IAT (0.67)   (0.87)   
Projective 0,00 (0.66)   0,29*** (0.64)  
Explicit 0,01 0,17 -- 0,26** 0,04 -- 
STUDY II 
  c) Pictorial Self IAT (n=57) c) Pictorial Attitude IAT (n=57) 
  IAT Projective Explicit IAT Projective Explicit 
IAT (0.65)     (0.85)     
Projective  0.07 (0.61)   0.51*** (0.68)  
Explicit 0.20 0.10 -- 0.11 0.27** -- 
Note: 
* p ≤ 0.10 
** p ≤ 0.05 
*** p ≤ 0.01 
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Table 2: correlations between the need for power measures and the behavioral measures 
STUDY I 
  a) Verbal self IAT b) Pictorial Attitude IAT  
Environmentalism IAT Projective Explicit IAT Projective Explicit 
Subjective -0,18 -0,27** -0,22* -0,20* -0,14 -0,35*** 
General 0,10 -0,32*** -0,16 -0,21* -0,31*** -0,29*** 
STUDY II   
  c) Pictorial Self IAT d) Pictorial Attitude IAT  
Environmentalism IAT Projective Explicit IAT Projective Explicit 
Subjective -0,20 -0,14 -0,14 -0,17 -0,28** -0,18 
General -0,18 -0,30** -0,19 
-
0,39*** -0,35*** -0,21 
Note: 
* p ≤ 0.10 
** p ≤ 0.05 
*** p ≤ 0.01 
 
 
 
 
Running Head: PICTORIAL ATTITUDE IAT AND IMPLICIT MOTIVES  39 
 
 
Table 3: Study3 - correlations of need for power measures with declarative and non-declarative 
measures across conditions 
 a) Implicit need for power  b) Explicit need for power  
  Power Arousal  
(n=38) 
Neutral 
(n=53) 
Fisher r‐to‐z 
transformation 
Power Arousal  
(n=38) 
Neutral 
(n=53) 
Fisher r‐to‐z 
transformation
0,32** -0,05 z=1,27; -0,19 0,00 z=0,88; Recalled displayed 
power words  p= 0,2   p= 0,38 
0,04 -0,14 z=0,83; -0,30* -0,09 z=0,98; Recalled displayed 
neutral words   p= 0,4   p= 0,32 
0,33** -0,10 z=1,98; -0,06 -0,18 z=0,56; Recalled self-generated 
power words  p= 0,05   p= 0,58 
0,05 -0,04 z=0,43; -0,03 -0,26* z=1,13; Recalled self-generated 
neutral words   p= 0,67   p= 0,26 
0,34** -0,05 z=1,88; -0,03 -0,21 z=0,83; Recalled pairs  
power words  p= 0,06   p= 0,4 
0,21 -0,04 z=1,12; 0,13 -0,21 z=1,59; Recalled pairs  
neutral words  p= 0,26  p= 0,11 
0,23 0,14 z=0,42; 0,02 -0,21 z=1,56; Task Enjoyment 
 p= 0,67  p= 0,12 
Note: 
* p ≤ 0.10 
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** p ≤ 0.05 
*** p ≤ 0.01 
 
